I want to comment on an interesting piece in CounterPunch from long-time peacenik and foreign policy maven Richard Falk. I trust Falk on the reality of Ukrainian oppression of its Russian-speaking minority. But it is this minority in the East that seems to be the chief victim of the Russian invasion, as the destruction of their cities proceeds apace, so how is that relevant? It should be clear that their well-being is not a factor in Putin's considerations, except as a transparent political pretext for his aggression -- the same sort of nonsense peddled by every imperialist aggressive power throughout history, including the U.S.A.
Max: I think you're omitting a very important point re the Soviets in Afghanistan, i.e., that the Carter Administration deliberately took actions that it knew (and hoped) would heighten the possibility that the Soviets would invade. How do we know? Because Zbig said so. I'm sure you've read his interview with Le Nouvel Observateur about this, but it's always illuminating (and always shocking) to take another look at his statements:
"Question: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs that the American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet intervention. Is this period, you were the national securty advisor to President Carter. You therefore played a key role in this affair. Is this correct?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahiddin began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention [emphasis added throughout].
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into the war and looked for a way to provoke it?
B: It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Q : When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against secret US involvement in Afghanistan , nobody believed them . However, there was an element of truth in this. You don’t regret any of this today?
B: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: “We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war." Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime , a conflict that bought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.
Q: And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?
B : What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?"
Knowing this, how can anyone discount the possibility that the US has followed the same gameplan in the case of Ukraine? Are there actions that the US has taken, outside of the ones we already know about (NATO expansion, training of Ukrainian armed forces and intelligence, providing arms, the 2014 Maidan antics, etc) that may have tipped Putin into invading? I was struck by how happy at least some of the Blob appeared to be very soon after the invasion, which suggests to me that the "strategic opportunity" you mention had been anticipated beforehand. (As an aside, it was also telling to hear Leon Panetta openly gloating in March that the US and Russia were now in a proxy war.) I think we need to put the Ukraine crisis in the context of the broader global geopolitical realignment that's taking place. Should the US risk war, perhaps a nuclear one, to retain its global hegemonic status? Do other countries have a claim to the same security interests we demand for ourselves? Can we live with a more powerful China and a slightly more powerful Russia? If not, what are the implications? What lessons will China draw if we destroy Russia? Is there a better way to organize the world to lessen the prospect of permanent war? I ask these questions in all sincerity. The end game we seem to be in flight forward toward is pretty damn frightening.
Max: I think you're omitting a very important point re the Soviets in Afghanistan, i.e., that the Carter Administration deliberately took actions that it knew (and hoped) would heighten the possibility that the Soviets would invade. How do we know? Because Zbig said so. I'm sure you've read his interview with Le Nouvel Observateur about this, but it's always illuminating (and always shocking) to take another look at his statements:
"Question: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs that the American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet intervention. Is this period, you were the national securty advisor to President Carter. You therefore played a key role in this affair. Is this correct?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahiddin began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention [emphasis added throughout].
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into the war and looked for a way to provoke it?
B: It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Q : When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against secret US involvement in Afghanistan , nobody believed them . However, there was an element of truth in this. You don’t regret any of this today?
B: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: “We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war." Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime , a conflict that bought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.
Q: And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?
B : What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?"
Knowing this, how can anyone discount the possibility that the US has followed the same gameplan in the case of Ukraine? Are there actions that the US has taken, outside of the ones we already know about (NATO expansion, training of Ukrainian armed forces and intelligence, providing arms, the 2014 Maidan antics, etc) that may have tipped Putin into invading? I was struck by how happy at least some of the Blob appeared to be very soon after the invasion, which suggests to me that the "strategic opportunity" you mention had been anticipated beforehand. (As an aside, it was also telling to hear Leon Panetta openly gloating in March that the US and Russia were now in a proxy war.) I think we need to put the Ukraine crisis in the context of the broader global geopolitical realignment that's taking place. Should the US risk war, perhaps a nuclear one, to retain its global hegemonic status? Do other countries have a claim to the same security interests we demand for ourselves? Can we live with a more powerful China and a slightly more powerful Russia? If not, what are the implications? What lessons will China draw if we destroy Russia? Is there a better way to organize the world to lessen the prospect of permanent war? I ask these questions in all sincerity. The end game we seem to be in flight forward toward is pretty damn frightening.